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INTRODUCTION 
Patents are a key aspect of intellectual property protection created to 
ensure sufficient incentives for innovative activity.  A patent gives its 
owner the right to exclude others from practicing the claimed invention 
for a defined term of years.  This right is conferred as a reward for 
inventive activity and the inventor’s disclosure of how to make and use 
the invention.1  In contrast, antitrust law attempts to protect consumers 
by prohibiting business conduct involving the abuse of market and 
monopoly power such as exclusionary actions and conspiracies to limit 
competition.  Thus, at a first glance, there appears to be a significant 
conflict in how patent and antitrust laws regard exclusion of competitors. 
In this Article, we assume that the goal of United States antitrust 
laws is to promote productive, allocative, and dynamic efficiency.2  
 
 * Professor of Economics, Stern School of Business, New York University; 
economides@stern.nyu.edu; http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/; Executive Director NET 
Institute; http://www.NETinst.org.  This Article was written when Professor Economides was 
visiting the Haas School of Business of the University of California, which he thanks for its 
hospitality. 
 ** Partner, Calvo & Clark LLP, One Lombard Street, 2nd Floor, San Francisco, CA  
94111; whebert@calvoclark.com. 
 1. The patent law’s enabling disclosure requirement benefits society in two ways.  First, 
the inventor’s know-how is shared with society upon publication of the patent application and 
may be practiced by others immediately upon expiration of the patent.  Second, the disclosure 
results in innovative new products or improvements to the invention; other inventors have 
incentives to design around the patent, or create patentable improvements upon the disclosed 
invention.  The patent system differs from trade secret law, although both regimes encourage 
invention.  See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).  Using trade 
secret law, a party protects its competitive advantage by legally excluding others from using 
information it properly maintains as a proprietary secret by making reasonable efforts to 
establish and maintain its confidentiality.  Trade secret protection is indefinite, lasting until 
another party obtains the information in a proper manner, such as intentional or accidental 
disclosure by the owner, independent invention, or discovery through reverse engineering.  
The most famous example is the formula for Coca-Cola, which has been kept secret and 
provided significant commercial benefits to its owner for over a century.  See, e.g., Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co. of Shreveport, v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 289 (D. Del. 1985). 
 2. Economists measure the benefit of alternative market structures in terms of societal 
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Productive efficiency means costs of creating goods are minimized.  
Allocative efficiency means that market prices for these goods are close to 
the incremental production costs.  Dynamic efficiency means that the 
appropriate amount of innovation occurs for both creating new products 
and reducing costs of existing ones.  Competition in a market economy 
creates, preserves, and enhances all three types of efficiency.  Antitrust 
law safeguards the business environment so that this competition can 
flourish. 
Patent law is an example of how public policy departs from relying 
on competition as the means of achieving efficiency.3  Patent grants 
establish legal monopolies with limited time durations.  Competition in a 
market of a patented product is given up in the hope that monopoly 
profits guaranteed by patent protection in the short run will provide the 
appropriate incentive to engage in innovative activity.  Departure from 
competition implies a loss of allocative and possibly productive 
efficiency.4  At least in theory, the grant of a patent trades a reduction in 
 
satisfaction or total surplus (‘‘TS’’), which is the sum of consumers’ surplus (‘‘CS’’) (defined as 
the net satisfaction of consumers from the operation of a market) and producers’ profits or 
producers’ surplus (‘‘PS’’).  Economists disagree on whether the aim of antitrust law should be 
to protect consumers’ surplus or to protect total surplus from anti-competitive actions.  
Maximization of productive, allocative, and dynamic efficiency also maximizes total surplus.  
For a discussion of what should be the objective of antitrust law, see Louis Kaplow & Carl 
Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1073, 1226 (A. Mitchell 
Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007); Dennis W. Carlton & Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and 
Regulation (Univ. of Chicago Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 312, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=937020; Joseph Farrell & Michael Katz, The Economics of Welfare 
Standards in Antitrust, COMPETITION POL’Y CENTER (Inst. of Bus. & Econ. Research, 
Berkeley, Cal.), July 20, 2006, available at 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1061&context=iber/cpc; Richard 
Gilbert, Holding Innovation to an Antitrust Standard, COMPETITION POL’Y CENTER (Inst. 
of Bus. & Econ. Research, Berkeley, Cal.), Spring 2007, available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=richard_gilbert. 
 3. Other examples of when public policy departs from using competition to achieve 
efficiency include government imposition of extensive safety regulations and minimum quality 
standards.  Additionally, in specific industries such as telecommunications, regulatory bodies 
have imposed pricing regulations (including maximum price regulation of various services), 
cost-based regulation on pricing of interconnection between competitors, and below cost 
pricing of basic telephone service (with the aim to maximize subscription to achieve ‘‘universal 
service’’).  For an analysis of regulation in telecommunications that imposes departures from 
allocative efficiency, see Nicholas Economides, Telecommunications Regulation: An 
Introduction, in THE LIMITS OF MARKET ORGANIZATION 48, 62 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 
2005), available at 
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Economides_Telecommunications_Regulation.pdf. 
 4. With a constant returns to scale technology of production, where unit cost remains 
constant for any level of production, competition among producers leads the market to 
maximization of total surplus.  A monopolist charging a single price in the same market would 
restrict output resulting in lower total surplus.  Such a monopolist would raise prices above 
marginal cost, thereby reducing allocative efficiency, and may also reduce productive efficiency 
by not strictly minimizing costs, since it faces no pressure by competition.  We should note 
that the theorem of total surplus maximization, as a result of competition, also holds as long as 
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allocative and possibly productive static efficiency for an increase in 
innovative activity.  Under the assumption that innovative activity is 
underprovided without patents, some increase in innovative activity will 
increase dynamic efficiency.  But without a specific calculation that will 
depend on the particulars of the market(s) involved, it is impossible to 
judge if the present patent law will lead to an under-provision, over-
provision, or the right intensity of innovative activity.  The broad legal 
patent framework that does not calibrate patent duration and breadth by 
market is likely to often miss achieving the right intensity of innovative 
activity, and therefore miss guiding the economy to maximum dynamic 
efficiency.  Specifically, there are substantial issues in the design and 
implementation of patent law that may prevent the market from 
achieving the appropriate amount of innovative activity that would 
precipitate dynamic efficiency.5 
In this Article, we will discuss issues that arise in the intersection of 
patents and antitrust.  We focus on antitrust issues that arise when a 
patent holder uses the monopoly power it possesses in the market for the 
patented product to exclude competitors in adjacent markets, which is 
sometimes broadly called ‘‘monopoly leveraging.’’  The courts have 
identified several categories of conduct by patent holders that might give 
rise to claims of monopoly leveraging.  Where the patent holder’s 
product uses an interface or interconnection with adjacent products, a 
patent holder can attempt to leverage its monopoly into adjacent markets 
by manipulating the interface.  In these circumstances a patent holder is 
tempted to obtain revenues from adjacent markets by excluding others 
from selling products or offering services that require its interface.  In 
these situations, the courts have considered and sometimes condemned 
monopolists’ efforts to control these markets through design changes and 
 
unit costs increase for sufficiently large levels of production.  However, when unit costs are 
decreasing for any level of production, competition does not necessarily result in total surplus 
maximization.  The same is true in the presence of network effects (increasing returns to scale 
in consumption).  E.g., Nicholas Economides & Fredrick Flyer, Compatibility and Market 
Structure for Network Goods (Stern Sch. of Bus., N.Y.U., Discussion Paper No. EC-98-02, 
1997), available at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/98-02.pdf (showing that, with strong 
network effects, competition may maximize consumers’ surplus but monopoly may maximize 
total surplus). 
 5. From a public policy point of view, the question is not just whether a particular 
invention is given a monopoly of a sufficient duration to guarantee sufficient incentives for this 
innovation.  There is an additional question of whether later innovators also have sufficient 
incentives to innovate despite the rights conferred to an early innovator.  Thus, the extent of 
monopoly conferred by a patent has to be limited skillfully so as not to interfere with the 
incentive to innovate of subsequent innovators.  See also Richard J. Gilbert & Michael L. 
Katz, Should Good Patents Come In Small Packages? A Welfare Analysis of Intellectual 
Property Bundling, COMPETITION POL’Y CENTER (Inst. of Bus. & Econ. Research, 
Berkeley, Cal.), Jan. 27, 2007, available at 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1067&context=iber/cpc. 
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product changes which, in effect, extend in time or expand in scope the 
claims of the original monopoly granted by a patent or other intellectual 
property. 
I. PATENTS 
Valid and enforceable patents give the owner a legal right to exclude 
others from using the claimed invention for a limited time.6  Examiners 
at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (‘‘USPTO’’) apply five 
principal criteria to determine patentability of an invention: (1) is the 
subject matter statutorily patentable?;7 (2) is the claimed invention 
novel?;8 (3) is the claimed invention useful?;9 (4) is the claimed invention 
non-obvious?;10 and (5) has the inventor described the invention with 
enough particularity such that those skilled in the art will be able to 
make, use, and understand the invention that the inventor made?11  If the 
patent applicant meets the statutory criteria, the examiners have no 
discretion: they must issue the patent.12  Issuance of a patent does not 
necessarily mean that the claimed invention is fundamentally innovative; 
the patent will issue if the claimed invention is simply sufficiently 
different from what came before it.13 
Once issued, the patent is presumed valid.14  Patent validity is tested 
in the crucible of litigation.  Challengers to patent rights must overcome 
the presumption of validity.  Decisionmakers, such as judges and juries, 
use this presumption as a procedural tool in resolving disputes.  ‘‘The 
decisionmaker is required to begin by accepting the proposition that the 
patent is valid and then looking to the challenger for proof to the 
contrary.’’15  The challenger bears the burden through any administrative 
proceeding or trial to prove that the patent is invalid; the burden never 
shifts to the patent holder to prove that the patent is valid.16 
 
 6. ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 4-5 (8th ed. 2007). 
 7. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (patentable subject matter includes ‘‘any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof’’). 
 8. Id. § 102. 
 9. Id. § 101; see text accompanying supra note 7. 
 10. Id. § 103(a) (to be patentable, it must be non-obvious ‘‘at the time the invention was 
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains’’). 
 11. Id. § 112. 
 12. HARMON, supra note 6, at 6. 
 13. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, & MARK A. LEMLEY, IP AND 
ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 12-26 (2007). 
 14. 35 U.S.C. § 282. 
 15. HARMON, supra note 6, at 34 (citing Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 733 F.2d 
881 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
 16. Id. 
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When the applicant is prosecuting his patent application, the 
examiner does not perform any cost/benefit analysis specific to the 
invention, the firms, the potential markets affected by the patent, or the 
impact of the patent in these markets.  Examiners at the USPTO do not 
conduct any examination of the costs and benefits of conferring upon the 
inventor the right to exclude others from using the claimed invention.  
Patent examiners typically possess degrees in science, engineering, or law.  
They are not experienced policy makers, they do not see themselves as 
policy makers, and they have no authority to make policy.  The 
examiners do not analyze the markets where the methods or products 
claimed by the patents will be sold.  They do not inquire whether the 
patentee will practice the patent by producing a product or using the 
claimed invention, or whether the patentee will sit on its patent rights 
and simply use the threat of enforcement to keep others from using its 
invention.  They do not inquire whether the patentee will license others 
to use the invention and, if so, at what rates. 
The issuance of any patent in its nascent state suffers from 
additional defects.  First, patents give property rights with considerable 
uncertainty as to their validity.17  This uncertainty arises in two ways: 
there is uncertainly over the precise boundaries of the patented claims 
and there is uncertainty about the claims’ validity and enforceability.18  
Accordingly, every child born in our patent kingdom is a pretender to a 
throne.  Also, the duration of every patent is uniform, although 
economic theory shows that it should depend on the particulars of 
market and other factors.  Patent rights are at best justified in law (but 
not in a case-by-case examination) based on ex ante expected profits.  
Additionally, patents may confer legal monopoly rights in more than one 
antitrust market.19  For example, an inventor who obtains a patent on a 
drug used to induce sleep might later find that it alleviates symptoms 
associated with diabetes.  Or, the patentee might find that by slightly 
modifying the formula, it can obtain a new patent and exclude a potential 
 
 17. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 
76 (2005). 
 18. The uncertainty of patent claims arises because of the litigation process to enforce the 
claims.  For example, the terms used in a granted claim may be ambiguous until a court 
construes them.  Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).  Or, an 
accused device might not literally infringe the claim, but does infringe under the doctrine of 
equivalents.  Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 
(2002).  And a claim could be found to be invalid because it is obvious.  KSR Int’l Co. v. 
Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).  These are just a few examples of the uncertainty that 
arises for plaintiffs and defendants in patent litigation. 
 19. A claim for violation of the antitrust laws requires the plaintiff to identify a relevant, 
economically significant product market.  B.V. Optische Industrie De Oude Delft v. Hologic, 
Inc., 909 F. Supp. 162, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).  An allegation that a particular product is 
‘‘unique’’, due to patent protection or otherwise, is insufficient to state a claim.  Id. 
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rival from both the old market and the new market.  An appropriately 
worded patent will permit the inventor of this single drug to exclude 
others from using the drug in two or more different antitrust markets. 
As economists have long argued, and the United States Supreme 
Court definitively ruled in 2006, the ownership of a patent does not 
burden the patent owner with a presumption that it possesses monopoly 
power in any particular market.20  Eight years before the Supreme 
Court’s antitrust jurisprudence caught up to economic theory, Congress 
had passed an amendment to the U.S. patent laws to relieve patent 
owners of the presumption that the ownership of a patent, without more, 
subjected them to claims of unfair competition by enforcing valid 
patents.21 
The converse of the rule eliminating the congruence between patent 
ownership and market power, however, is that the antitrust market in 
which a patentee possesses market power might extend beyond the four 
corners of the patent grant.  If the patentee has market power beyond the 
four corners of the patent, then the immunity from suit granted by 
Congress for enforcement of the patent should not extend to the full 
boundaries of the antitrust market.  The key questions for both patentees 
and economists are determining the borders of the lawful patent 
monopoly and the types of conduct that unlawfully leverages the patent 
grant beyond those borders.  The importance of these questions to policy 
makers is that appropriate enforcement will enhance consumer welfare.  
The importance of these questions to the patent holder is that it might 
find itself subject to government enforcement action, criminal liability, 
private antitrust suits, civil damages, and treble damages.22 
II. INTERSECTION OF PATENTS AND ANTITRUST 
There are a number of issues that arise in antitrust enforcement 
from the vague definition and the leveraging of patents.23  Antitrust 
examines business conduct based on existing property rights.  Any 
property right, based on real or intellectual property, can be abused in 
business conduct resulting in an antitrust violation.24  Thus, when 
 
 20. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42-43 (2006). 
 21. Act of Nov. 19, 1988, § 201, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5) (2006). 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 23. We omit from discussion in this Article issues that pertain to conspiracies to restrain 
trade.  We focus here only on single firm conduct and we do not discuss antitrust issues that 
arise from attempts to collude using patent pools as a pretext.  For a more extensive discussion 
of these issues, see Richard J. Gilbert, Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy 
Evolution, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2004); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent 
Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391 (2003). 
 24. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(antitrust defendant’s claim that it had ‘‘an absolute and unfettered right to use its intellectual 
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property rights are well defined, there is nothing special in regard to 
rights arising out of a patent grant or other intellectual property 
protection. 
When patents and antitrust potentially clash, typically antitrust 
examination and enforcement will occur (i) after the grant of a patent; 
(ii) where a product based on a patent has successfully reached the 
market; and (iii) where the grantee managed to get monopoly power in a 
market.  Thus, typical antitrust violations will occur for relatively few 
issued patents because of the winnowing process that takes place between 
issuance of a patent and its assertion against an alleged infringer by a 
monopolist.  It is very difficult to anticipate a conflict between the 
granting of a patent and antitrust rules at the time of the grant because of 
the time separating the patent examination and the potential antitrust 
violation, and various other factors involved how the patent holder 
develops products and achieves market power.  Patent examiners do not 
consider potential antitrust violations prior to granting a patent.  
Antitrust examination and intervention are ex post to the patent grant.  
It is impossible to conceive an ex ante patent examination process that 
could address all of the defects which the USPTO’s constituents, such as 
technology firms and pharmaceutical companies, discussed below, have 
identified. 
Because of the very significant uncertainty of the infringement, 
validity, and enforceability of a patent, some commentators have referred 
to patents as ‘‘lottery tickets.’’25  Inventors apply for patents on the off-
chance that their invention might be a huge commercial success.  The 
cost to apply for and prosecute a patent application using a law firm is 
relatively low in comparison to the possible pay-off.26  In fact, most 
inventors are disappointed with their patents, since they cannot even 
muster the few hundred dollars to pay the maintenance fees over the life 
of the patent after it is issued.27  But once a patent is issued, the patent 
holder can authorize a law firm to circulate threats of infringement, serve 
demand letters, and file lawsuits.  Defending these lawsuits may cost 
 
property as it wishes’’ was held to be ‘‘no more correct than the proposition that use of one’s 
personal property, such as a baseball bat, cannot give rise to tort liability’’). 
 25. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 17, at 80-83. 
 26. The average costs for filing a new patent application are approximately range $15,398 
for a complex chemical or biological patent, $13,684 for a complex electrical or computer 
patent, $11,482 for a complex mechanical patent, and $8,548 for a patent of minimal 
complexity with 10 pages and 10 claims.  AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, 2007 
REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY I78-80 (2007).  Costs to prepare an amendment to 
respond to a USPTO Office Action average approximately $4,448 for complex biotechnology 
or chemical patents, $3,910 for complex electrical or computer patents, $3,506 for complex 
mechanical patents, and $2,244 for patent of minimal complexity.  Id. 
 27. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 17, at 80 (noting that 55-67% of patents lapse before 
the end of their term because maintenance fees are not paid). 
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hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars, even if they result in 
dismissal and a complete vindication of the alleged infringer’s defenses.28 
Congress has sought to find a solution through legislation,29 but the 
divergent interests of the patent system’s constituents has thus far 
prevented consensus on a legislative fix.  The solution to the conflict 
between patents and antitrust will not be found in ex ante legislation or 
patent examination procedures.  It must be found in ex post enforcement 
of the patent and antitrust laws. 
Companies in different sectors of the economy have various and 
conflicting complaints of the patent system.  Software and technology 
companies complain that the USPTO should raise the standards for 
granting patents.30  They complain that the USPTO grants too many 
patents.  Patent infringement suits are expensive to defend.  As a result, 
software and technology companies argue for more stringent standards to 
obtain patents, or less onerous penalties for alleged infringement, such as 
limiting the circumstances under which treble damages would be 
awarded.31  On the other hand, pharmaceutical and chemical companies 
argue for a strong patent regime.32  These companies want the USPTO 
to issue patents for their inventions and they want enforcement to be 
easier in order to protect the significant investment--- sometimes 
hundreds of millions of dollars--- that they have incurred to bring a drug 
or treatment to market.33 
If we accept the premise embodied in United States patent law, that 
a valid and enforceable patent confers a limited monopoly, the only check 
on potential abuse of that monopoly is antitrust law.  The statutory 
patent monopoly either grants the patentee immunity from the antitrust 
laws or the patentee is subject to the antitrust laws in markets adjacent to 
the invention claimed by the patent.34  If the patent confers upon the 
 
 28. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, 2005 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC 
SURVEY 22-26 (2005).  According to the 2005 AIPLA Survey, which is published bi-
annually, the median litigation cost of a patent lawsuit ranged from $650,000 (where there was 
less than $1.0 million in dispute) to $4.5 million (where there was more than $25 million at 
risk). 
 29. Recent past and current proposed legislation considered in Congress includes Patent 
Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005), Patents Depend on Quality Act of 
2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. (2006), Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. 
(2006), Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007), and Patent Reform Act 
of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 30. See, e.g., Gregg Hitt, Industries Brace For Tough Battle Over Patent Law, WALL 
ST. J., June 6, 2007, at A1 (noting that Microsoft and Cisco are promoting legislation to make 
patents ‘‘harder to get, and easier to challenge’’). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. (noting that Eli Lilly & Co. and Pfizer Inc. oppose legislative changes that will 
make it easier to launch and win patent challenges). 
 33. Id. 
 34. See, e.g., In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 
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patentee absolute immunity from the antitrust laws, our inquiry is at an 
end since any anti-competitive conduct of the patentee in adjacent 
markets is shielded from antitrust scrutiny.  If, however, the patent does 
not confer absolute immunity, antitrust laws can still limit the patentee’s 
conduct in antitrust markets adjacent to the patent monopoly.  United 
States antitrust law reflects this policy.35 
III. APPLICATION TO ADJACENT MARKETS 
To understand how antitrust law may apply to markets adjacent to 
the patent monopoly, consider the following simple case.  Let us assume 
that a company A is awarded a patent that confers exclusive rights to 
make and sell certain products of type A in a single antitrust market and 
assume that the company has gained monopoly power in A.36  Assume 
further that products of type B are complementary to A and are produced 
by various companies in a separate antitrust market.  The market for B is 
considered an ‘‘adjacent’’ market to the market for A for antitrust 
purposes.  Further, assume company A gains exclusive control over the 
complementary market between product A and product B by using its 
patent and monopoly over the market for A to control the interface 
between the two product types.  In particular, company A can modify the 
interface between product A and product B to exclude any producer of 
product B or selectively reduce the quality of a combination of product A 
and product B of particular producers.  Thus, the patent holder, company 
A, can use its monopoly in the market for A to leverage and extend its 
legally-granted monopoly to the market for B.  We argue that company 
A’s actions may violate antitrust law, despite the immunity granted by its 
patent.  This scenario can be extended to a case where the patent holder 
does not have monopoly power in the market for A but can still control 
the market for B since the products of type B are only compatible with 
the particular patented product A. 
 
2000). 
 35. See, e.g, Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34.  The United States Department of Justice 
(‘‘DOJ’’) sued Microsoft for, among other things, exclusionary conduct in violation of Section 2 
of the Sherman Act on the grounds that Microsoft had used technology to discourage 
consumers from removing its Internet browser from its operating system, and it had 
commingled the browser code and operating system code so that removal of Microsoft’s 
browser would disable the entire operating system.  Microsoft argued that its intellectual 
property authorized its conduct.  Irrespective of Microsoft’s particular conduct alleged by the 
DOJ, the court of appeals wrote: ‘‘Intellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to 
violate the antitrust laws.’’  Id. at 63 (citing In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 
at 1325). 
 36. As we have discussed earlier, legal monopoly rights do not necessarily imply 
monopoly power in an antitrust market.  A firm with legal monopoly rights in a particular 
product may face considerable competition from close substitutes and therefore have no 
monopoly power. 
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For example, the market for A may consist of durable goods and the 
market for B may consist of products and services that are purchased 
after product A, such as maintenance plans, parts, or supplies that are 
needed over the lifetime of the patented product sold by company A.  In 
other cases, the sequence of purchases of product A and product B is not 
crucial.  In particular, product A may be a patented computer operating 
system while products of type B are software applications that are 
compatible only with this operating system, with both the operating 
system and applications purchased in the same transaction.  The adjacent 
markets are not necessarily subject to network effects, except those that 
arise from the direct complementarity between product A and product 
B.37 
From an economics point of view, a properly designed patent 
system should give company A a temporary monopoly franchise only for 
the patented invention, embodied in product A.  The prospect of a 
temporary monopoly and the resulting monopoly rents should be a 
sufficient incentive for company A to engage in the innovation required 
to produce a novel and non-obvious product A.  For the duration of the 
patent monopoly, society temporarily trades the loss in consumer surplus 
for the adequate incentive for company A to invent product A.  Given 
the loss of consumer surplus, this incentive ideally should be as exact as 
possible, offering potential innovators no more than is necessary.  It is 
economically inefficient and therefore inappropriate for a patent system 
to offer potential innovators a greater incentive than is necessary.  We 
focus on how this inefficient excess incentive may influence adjacent 
markets.  In this instance, company A might gain an additional 
monopoly in the adjacent market for B by leveraging its monopoly in the 
market for product A, resulting in a loss in consumer surplus in both the 
market for A and the market for B.  The additional loss of consumer 
surplus in the adjacent market for B may not be economically warranted 
if company A already has an adequate incentive from its temporary 
monopoly in the market for A.  The impact of this potential economic 
inefficiency is directly correlated to the number of complementary 
goods---and resulting adjacent markets---product A enjoys.  For 
example, a new patented drug may be complementary with a syringe to 
administer it, specialized medical services, hospital facilities and 
procedures, and so on. 
Among economists, there has been a considerable discussion on 
whether a monopolist in the market for A is able to reap additional 
 
 37. See Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Networks, 14 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 673, 
675-99 (1996), available at  
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Economides_Economics_of_Networks.pdf. 
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monopoly profits of a complementary product B.  The so-called 
‘‘Chicago School Theory,’’ first proposed in the 1950s by Aaron Director 
and Edward Levi, states that there is a ‘‘single monopoly profit’’ in the 
combination of a sale of product A with product B, and therefore any 
leveraging of the monopoly in market A over market B cannot be 
attributed to anti-competitive motivations.38  According to the Chicago 
School Theory, if company A attempts to control market B, it must be 
for efficiency-enhancing reasons.  Today, it is well understood that the 
Chicago School Theory holds only in very exceptional circumstances that 
rarely arise in typical patent leveraging cases.39  Therefore, for almost all 
cases of adjacent markets, it should be understood that monopoly profits 
in market B are not captured automatically by a monopolist in market A.  
The more typical patent-leveraging scenario, however, is a ‘‘dual 
monopoly profits’’ case, where company A cannot reap the monopoly 
profits in market B by mere virtue of its patent for product A and the 
ensuing temporary monopoly in market A. 
When the circumstances are such that the single monopoly profit 
theory holds, we might consider the patent system optimized if company 
A receives a patent in product A since company A will limit its 
leveraging of monopoly in market A to gain monopoly profits in both 
market A and market B in only those instances where it is economically 
efficient.  In contrast, if we are in a dual monopoly profits scenario, it 
would not be appropriate for the patent system to reward company A 
(the patent holder for product A) with a monopoly in market B and let 
company A reap monopoly profits from product B, thereby reducing 
consumer surplus of product B.  In neither case is it appropriate for 
antitrust immunity to award additional profits in product B to the patent 
holder for product A.  In the single monopoly profit case, the monopolist 
of market A has already reaped the economically efficient profits in 
product B through the patent for A.  In the dual monopoly profits case, 
 
 38. See Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 
NW. U. L. REV. 281, 290 (1956). 
 39. For the single monopoly profit theory to be correct, it is required that products A and 
B are combined in a fixed and constant ratio irrespective of the prevailing prices, each buyer 
buys only one unit, there is perfect foresight, market B is perfectly competitive, and the goods 
are produced with a constant returns to scale technology (has constant unit cost).  These 
requirements are very restrictive and typically at least one of them fails to hold, thereby 
invalidating single monopoly profit theory.  First, most complementary goods are consumed in 
variable proportions depending on prices.  For example, when the prices of ink and paper are 
low, more of them are used in conjunction with the same printer.  Second, many buyers buy 
more than one unit of a good.  For example, a hospital buys many units of beds, of each type of 
drug, and so on.  Third, in many markets consumers do not have sufficient information to 
calculate future costs.  Fourth, in many markets competition is weak or non-existent.  Fifth, 
for most goods, unit cost varies with the number of units produced.  See also Joseph Farrell, 
Deconstructing Chicago on Exclusive Dealing, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. 465 (2005). 
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it is not appropriate for company A to receive antitrust immunity when 
its actions might harm consumers in the market for B.  Company A has 
the incentive to engage in anti-competitive leveraging of its patent in 
product A to earn additional monopoly profits from product B in excess 
of that required to innovate in market A. 
In the single monopoly profit case, the monopolist of market A 
does not need to take anti-competitive leveraging action, since he already 
reaps monopoly profits of product B.  In contrast, in the dual monopoly 
profits case, the monopolist of market A can take a number of anti-
competitive actions.  Many of these actions can be monopoly 
maintenance and tying actions that are available to a monopolist 
irrespective of the source of his monopoly power.40  Additionally, there 
are anti-competitive actions that arise directly from the control of the 
interface between product A and product B because of company A’s 
patent on product A.  We focus on instances when patent holders extend 
their temporary monopoly over the market for the patented product to 
adjacent markets by controlling the interface with complementary 
products.41  Interfaces have become increasingly important as growth in 
productivity depends more and more upon networks and the ability to 
add on applications, or replace old parts with new.  Controlling the 
interface becomes important for the patent holder, the consumers who 
demand innovation and change, and the competitors who seek to deliver 
either the desired innovation and change or similar products at a lower 
price. 
Antitrust case law provides a number of examples where patent 
holders have had their wrists slapped for trying to extend their patent 
 
 40. See Kaplow & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 1226; Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason & John 
Metzler, Links Between Markets and Aftermarkets: Kodak (1997), in ANTITRUST 
REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION AND POLICY 428, 452 (John E. 
Kwoka & Lawrence J. White eds., 2003); Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, A Primer on 
Foreclosure, 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2145, 2219 (Mark Armstrong 
& Robert H. Porter eds., 2007), available at http://idei.fr/doc/by/tirole/primer.pdf; Michael 
D. Whinston, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (2006); BARRY NALEBUFF, DEP’T 
OF TRADE & INDUS., BUNDLING, TYING, AND PORTFOLIO EFFECTS, PART 1: 
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES (2003), available at http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file14774.pdf. 
 41. In many traditional mechanical products, the interfaces can be observed directly or 
established through reverse engineering.  In the world of software, interfaces are much more 
difficult to decipher and reverse engineer.  Thus, even firms without patents can control 
interfaces.  A good example of this is the interfaces of the Windows PC operating system with 
software applications.  Applications developers have to rely on Microsoft information on these 
interfaces, commonly called Application Protocol Interfaces (‘‘APIs’’) because they cannot 
reverse engineer them.  Fortunately for developers, Microsoft has a strong interest to disclose 
these APIs to producers of software that is complementary to Windows so that more 
applications get written for Windows and the value and sales of Windows are enhanced.  
However, this interest is reversed when Microsoft also produces the complementary goods in 
competition with third-party developers, such as the office productivity applications including 
Word, Excel, and Outlook bundled under Microsoft Office. 
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monopolies into adjacent markets, even though courts have exercised 
considerable restraint.42  This restraint is based upon three key concerns.  
First, judges and juries are not necessarily qualified to determine whether 
the needs of the marketplace justify a particular product offering.43  
Second, courts do not want to curb innovation by imposing restrictions 
on normal technological advancements.44  Third, courts are reluctant to 
inquire into the patentee’s state of mind when the patentee asserts that 
its patents give it a right to exclude competitors.45 
Courts diverge in handling the third concern.  The First, Ninth, 
and D.C. Circuits have authorized judges and juries to view with 
skepticism the claim by an intellectual property owner that its intellectual 
property rights give it unfettered control over adjacent markets.46  By 
contrast, the Federal Circuit has precluded judges and juries from 
inquiring into the patentee’s state of mind when it asserts a valid patent.47  
Despite these conflicts between circuits, there exists a middle ground 
where antitrust law trumps patent law in adjacent markets.  In these 
adjacent market cases, it is inappropriate for patentees to gain immunity 
from antitrust law because judges, juries, and antitrust enforcers have 
more than sufficient skill and judgment to discern the difference between 
fair competition and unreasonable market manipulation. 
We discuss four types of adjacent markets where the antitrust laws 
hold equal, if not superior, sway to the patent laws in achieving the 
proper level of economic efficiency: (i) complementary peripherals and 
 
 42. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 63; C.R. Bard, Inc. v M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 
1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 
(9th Cir. 1997). 
 43. Medtronic MiniMed Inc. v. Smiths Med. MD Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 578, 589 (D. 
Del. 2005) (‘‘Absent evidence of anticompetitive conduct, however, it is not the role of the 
courts to determine how companies should innovate.’’); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. Int’l 
Bus. Machs. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 439 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (‘‘Where there is a difference of 
opinion as to the advantages of two alternatives which can both be defended from an 
engineering standpoint, the court will not allow itself to be enmeshed ‘in a technical inquiry 
into the justifiability of product innovations.’’’ (citation omitted)), aff’d sub nom. Memorex 
Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 44. See Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 63 (noting that courts are skeptical about claims 
that competition has been harmed by a dominant firm’s product design changes); Berkey 
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 286 n.30 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that courts 
should ‘‘exercise caution’’ in condemning a monopolist merely for introducing new products). 
 45. See, e.g., In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1327-28 (refusing to 
inquire into subjective motivation of patentee to refuse to sell or license its patented works, or 
to bring suit to enforce the same right). 
 46. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 63; Image Technical Servs., 125 F.3d 1195; Data Gen. 
Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1184 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 47. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1327 (declining to follow 
Image Technical Servs., 125 F.3d 1195); but see C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d 1340 (jury could 
conclude that patentee unlawfully monopolized adjacent market through design changes to 
patented product). 
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software markets; (ii) aftermarket parts, maintenance, and service; (iii) 
interface design changes; and (iv) changes in drug formulas.  The specific 
anti-competitive conduct and actual effect in each of these markets may 
differ, but the general tactic is the same: the patentee extends the patent 
monopoly beyond the market for the patented product.48  As we discuss 
below, in these four types of adjacent markets, the patentee will typically 
lose the immunity otherwise provided by patent law.  Instead, courts 
routinely apply regular antitrust principles to resolve disputes between 
the patent-holder monopolist in market A and the potentially-harmed 
competitor in market B. 
A. Complementary Peripheral and Software Markets 
This section describes how courts apply antitrust law to determine 
when a monopolist in one market uses its intellectual property rights---
patent and otherwise--- to engage in an unreasonable restraint of trade in 
complementary adjacent markets for computer and telephony peripherals 
and software. 
Early cases involved antitrust suits by computer peripheral device 
makers against IBM after IBM changed the design of the physical plug 
interface to its computers in a way that rendered prior peripheral plug 
designs incompatible.  The judicial debate over the antitrust implications 
of product innovations has been framed by two conflicting views 
developed in these cases.  The prevalent view is that a product change 
that has lessened competition for peripheral products is beyond antitrust 
scrutiny if the monopolist offers any justification for the change.  In this 
view, the courts refuse to evaluate technical decisions and the pros and 
cons of different design choices. 
While these cases did not involve antitrust claims related to 
leveraging of patent monopolies, their holdings established a framework 
for deciding when a dominant firm uses intellectual property, in the 
general sense, to engage in conduct that unreasonably restrains trade in 
adjacent markets.  Also, none of these early cases directly involved the 
assertion of patents by IBM against the peripheral parts competitors.  
That development occurred after the courts raised the importance of 
asserting patent and other intellectual property rights to justify certain 
business behavior by IBM.49 
 
 48. We purposefully exclude the doctrine of equivalents, which permits a patentee to 
stretch the claims somewhat beyond the literal boundaries of the claimed invention.  Festo 
Corp., 535 U.S. 722.  The markets we describe comprise those markets for products clearly 
beyond the monopoly created by the granted claims, even assuming the claims have been 
interpreted to their outermost borders by the doctrine of equivalents. 
 49. See Image Technical Servs., 125 F.3d 1195.  Also, in Telex Corp. v. International 
Business Machines Corp., the plaintiff initially filed an antitrust claim, which IBM met with a 
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In Telex Corp. v. IBM, the plaintiff alleged that IBM had 
unlawfully monopolized the market for plug-compatible peripheral 
products for IBM computers, such as information storage components, 
which include magnetic tape drives, magnetic disk drives, magnetic 
drums, printers, and other specialized memory units.50  The court found 
that IBM did not have monopoly power in the market for plug-
compatible peripheral products because competition existed between 
various system manufacturers and because manufacturers of peripheral 
devices could easily shift production from IBM to non-IBM plug-
compatible peripherals, and vice versa.51  Additionally, IBM did not have 
market power in the relevant market and its product changes produced 
lower prices.  While these lower prices were still above cost, they were 
not predatory.52 
Although the plaintiff in Telex challenged only the lower prices 
associated with IBM’s new products and not whether the design changes 
created incompatibility with competing devices, plaintiffs in later cases 
claimed IBM changed its plug design to harm competition.  In ILC 
Peripherals v. IBM Corp., the plaintiff was a maker of external storage 
devices that were plug-compatible with IBM computers, including disk 
drives, disk drive control units, and communications control units.53  The 
plaintiff alleged that IBM made design changes to plugs and controllers 
on its computers to render the computers incompatible with the products 
of competitors in this market.54  The experts who testified for both sides 
disagreed on the degree to which the changes were innovative and the 
amount of legitimate consumer benefit derived from said changes.55  
After an extensive review of the product changes and the testimony, the 
court held that the peripheral manufacturer failed to carry its burden that 
IBM’s conduct had been anti-competitive.56  It did not help that the 
evidence showed that the plaintiff was not making devices that depended 
upon IBM-compatible plugs.57 
In a subsequent case, another judge attempted to formulate a 
general standard in Sherman Act Section 2 cases involving product 
design changes in which a competitor challenged the new product 
 
counterclaim for trade secret misappropriation and copyright infringement of certain manuals.  
510 F.2d 894, 898 (10th Cir. 1975).  IBM did not appeal the district court’s decision on its 
copyright claim.  Id. at 928.  Nor did IBM assert infringement of any of its patents. 
 50. Id. at 899. 
 51. Id. at 916, 919. 
 52. Id. at 919-928. 
 53. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp., 458 F. Supp. at 428. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 439. 
 56. Id. at 439-40. 
 57. Id. at 439. 
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introductions of an alleged monopolist.  In re IBM Peripheral EDP 
Devices Antitrust Litigation,58 makers of peripheral devices compatible 
with IBM mainframe computers challenged IBM’s design of its 
products, which prevented the use of the competitors’ peripheral devices.  
The court held: 
If the design choice is unreasonably restrictive of competition, the 
monopolist’s conduct violates the Sherman Act.  This standard will 
allow the factfinder to consider the effects of the design on 
competitors; the effects of the design on consumers; the degree to 
which the design was the product of desirable technological 
creativity; and the monopolist’s intent, since a contemporaneous 
evaluation by the actor should be helpful to the factfinder in 
determining the effects of a technological change.59 
This case did not involve patents, but its holding is close to where the 
courts have ended up in cases that do involve patent holders whose 
conduct unreasonably restrains trade in adjacent markets. 
Courts have also found that a monopolist can be held liable for 
making design changes to its interfaces that prevent competitors from 
selling their otherwise compatible products.  In Northeastern Telephone 
Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., the court held that a 
monopolist could be found liable under antitrust law because it 
intentionally designed a telephone network coupling device with 
diminished functionality in order to impede competition.60  The court 
noted: ‘‘In other circumstances, we might be reluctant to allow a jury to 
second-guess engineers’ decisions as to the proper construction of a 
sophisticated piece of equipment.  But in this case we cannot look to the 
reaction of the competitive market to determine whether one design is 
superior to another.’’61  Thus, the court in this case found antitrust 
liability because the interface was manipulated to diminish the quality of 
the complementary good when produced by competitors.  While this 
case did not involve the assertion of patent rights, it stated a general 
proposition for when a court should scrutinize interface design decisions 
of patent holders if the temporary monopoly created by the patent 
removes the presumption that interface design changes are the inherently 
 
 58. 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Transamerica 
Computer Co. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 698 F. 2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 59. Id. at 1003; see also Cal. Computer Prods., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d 
727 (9th Cir. 1979) (plaintiffs challenged IBM’s integration of disk drive controllers into its 
newest computers on antitrust grounds, but the court rejected plaintiffs’ claim finding that the 
integrated products performed the same function as the old components about as well, but 
were significantly cheaper, which resulted in consumer benefit). 
 60. Ne. Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 95 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 61. Id. at 94-95 & n.29. 
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superior result of competitive market forces. 
Courts have also been willing to curb operating system software 
monopolists’ efforts to impede consumers’ use of complementary 
software applications developed by competitors.  In United States v. 
Microsoft Corp.,62 the D.C. Circuit examined Microsoft’s design of its 
Windows operating system and its potential anti-competitive effect on 
complementary software applications, especially Internet browsers 
developed by third-parties such as Netscape, which competed with 
Microsoft’s Internet Explorer.63  The lower court found Microsoft liable 
for a wide range of anti-competitive conduct.64  In reviewing the district 
court’s opinion, the D.C. Circuit identified two areas where Microsoft 
could have been found to have violated the antitrust laws.65  First, the 
court found that Microsoft used its Original Equipment Manufacturer 
(‘‘OEM’’) licenses with personal computer sellers such as Dell and 
Hewlett-Packard to prohibit the OEMs from installing rival Internet 
browsers or modifying the operating system’s start-up sequence.66  This 
practice ensured Microsoft’s Internet Explorer would always be displayed 
to the user instead of a rival’s browser.67  Second, the D.C. Circuit found 
that Microsoft had taken steps to inextricably integrate its Internet 
Explorer browser with its operating system in a manner that discouraged 
end users from using competing Internet Web browsers.68 
Microsoft justified its actions in two ways.  First, Microsoft asserted 
that because it owned the copyright to the Windows operating system 
and display, it had the right to dictate how the system started up.69  
Second, Microsoft claimed its integration of the operating system and 
Internet Explorer was necessary for stability and consistency of the 
platform.70  In ruling on these issues, the court noted, ‘‘[a]s a general rule, 
courts are properly very skeptical about claims that competition has been 
harmed by a dominant firm’s product design changes.’’71  The court 
elsewhere stated, ‘‘[a] monopolist does not violate the antitrust laws 
simply by developing a product that is incompatible with those of its 
rivals. . . .  In order to violate the antitrust laws, the incompatible product 
must have an anticompetitive effect that outweighs any procompetitive 
 
 62. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34. 
 63. Id. at 60-74. 
 64. Id. at 58. 
 65. Id. at 71, 74. 
 66. Id. at 60-64. 
 67. Id. at 61. 
 68. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 64-67. 
 69. Id. at 62-63. 
 70. Id. at 63-64. 
 71. Id. at 65. 
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justification for the design.’’72  Nonetheless, despite this professed 
skepticism about the government’s claims, the court upheld the district 
court’s finding that Microsoft had used anti-competitive design tactics.73  
In particular, the court held that Microsoft could not assert its 
intellectual property rights as a copyright owner to exclude competition 
in the separate market for Internet browsers.74  The court further found 
that Microsoft offered no evidence that the stability of the platform 
would suffer if changes were made.75  In general terms, the Microsoft 
court scrutinized a monopolist’s decisions in designing and modifying the 
interface required to interconnect complementary products from an 
adjacent market to the monopolist’s product in a manner that produced 
monopoly power within a separate market.  Specifically, the court 
expressly compared the pro-competitive benefits of the design and 
changes to the interface with the anti-competitive harms that might 
result if the new design allowed Microsoft to unfairly advantage its own 
complementary software, at the expense of competitors in the same 
adjacent market. 
The Microsoft court’s analysis is similar to the balancing test 
articulated in In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation.76  
In both cases, the court would permit the judge or the jury to weigh the 
pro-competitive benefits and the monopolist’s justifications for its design 
changes against the anti-competitive effects to determine whether the 
design changes are unduly restrictive of competition.  In cases involving 
the assertion of intellectual property, this approach allows the courts to 
fill the gap in the patent system by using the antitrust laws to address the 
market failures that occur when patentees try to leverage their monopoly 
in one market into another adjacent market.  A patent system which 
allows company A to manipulate the interface between product A and 
product B provides company A with a greater incentive than is necessary 
to spur innovation.  To allow company A to use the interface as a way to 
extend its monopoly in A into the market for B also decreases consumer 
surplus because it stifles competition in market B.  By proper application 
 
 72. Id. at 75 (citations omitted). 
 73. Id. at 64. 
 74. See Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 63-67.  The court of appeals stated: 
 Microsoft’s primary copyright argument borders upon the frivolous.  The 
company claims an absolute and unfettered right to use its intellectual property as it 
wishes: ‘‘If intellectual property rights have been lawfully acquired,’’ it says, then 
‘‘their subsequent exercise cannot give rise to antitrust liability.’’  That is no more 
correct than the proposition that use of one’s personal property, such as a baseball 
bat, cannot give rise to tort liability. 
Id. at 63 (citation omitted); see also Harry First, Microsoft and the Evolution of the 
Intellectual Property Concept, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1369, 1376-94 (2006). 
 75. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 63-64. 
 76. 481 F. Supp. 965. 
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of the antitrust laws, courts can enhance competition in market B 
without eliminating the incentives for company A to engage in the 
innovation that led to the grant of the patent in A in the first place. 
B. Aftermarkets: Parts, Service, and Maintenance 
With the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. 
Image Technical Services, Inc., the Court signaled a fundamental shift in 
private litigation of intellectual property antitrust claims within 
aftermarkets related to intellectual property rights in the primary 
market.77  In Kodak, the Court held that a manufacturer of durable 
goods could be found liable for illegally monopolizing the derivative 
aftermarket for parts and services for those goods and for refusing to deal 
with third-party independent service organizations (‘‘ISOs’’), even if it 
possessed patents and copyrights.78  In Kodak, the defendant 
manufactured photocopiers and microfilm equipment.79  A group of 
ISOs sued Kodak, alleging that it had used its monopoly in one 
market--- its installed base of reproduction machines--- to monopolize the 
aftermarket for goods and services of those machines.80  In the ensuing 
trial, the ISOs proved that Kodak had refused to sell them parts or to 
permit its customers to allow the ISOs to service Kodak’s machines.81  
Kodak raised as a defense that it had a valid business justification for 
refusing to deal with the ISOs because it held patents on its replacement 
parts for its equipment and copyrights on its diagnostic and service 
software.82  A Kodak witness testified, and its lawyers argued, that its 
intellectual property rights justified its refusal to deal with the ISOs, even 
though it had not affirmatively filed suit against the ISOs for patent or 
copyright infringement.83 
The Ninth Circuit’s 1997 opinion in Image Technical Services, 
after the district court’s decision on Kodak’s remand from the Supreme 
Court, addressed for the first time the relationship of intellectual 
property rights and antitrust law and whether a monopolist’s refusal to 
deal with competing providers of complementary goods (the ISOs) could 
be justified by its patents and copyrights. 84  The Ninth Circuit held that 
a monopolist who has achieved a dominant position through its patents 
and copyrights can violate the Sherman Act by exploiting that dominant 
 
 77. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
 78. Id. at 471-72, 479 & n.29. 
 79. Id. at 455. 
 80. Id. at 455-56. 
 81. Image Technical Servs., 125 F.3d at 1208-09. 
 82. See id. at 1214. 
 83. See id. at 1218-19. 
 84. See id. 
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position to attain a monopoly in another market.85  While patents and 
copyrights could be raised as a business justification for a refusal to deal, 
these intellectual property rights did not confer an absolute immunity 
from suit.86  The Ninth Circuit adopted a rebuttable presumption that 
the assertion of intellectual property rights constituted a valid business 
justification for any immediate harm to consumers.87  However, this 
presumption could be overcome by evidence that the assertion of 
intellectual property rights was a pretext that masked anti-competitive 
conduct.88  The Ninth Circuit held that, in appropriate cases such as 
Image Technical Services, the antitrust laws will trump intellectual 
property rights. 
After Kodak, defendants in antitrust cases began to affirmatively 
assert their patent and other intellectual property rights so that their 
rivals could not claim that their refusal to grant licenses was a mere 
‘‘pretext.’’89  The effect has been that monopolists who own patents assert 
their intellectual property rights---particularly in cases where the rival 
might assert violation of the antitrust laws under a Kodak theory.90 
This strategy of asserting patent rights in antitrust actions has been 
successful and has resulted in at least one significant court opinion 
rejecting the ‘‘rebuttable presumption’’ articulated in Image Technical 
Services, despite the similarity between defendant’s and Kodak’s conduct.  
In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation (‘‘CSU v. 
Xerox’’),91 the plaintiff was an ISO for Xerox photocopiers.92  Like 
Kodak, Xerox developed a policy to stop selling parts to any ISO that 
was not an end-user of Xerox equipment, after previously selling parts 
without condition to ISOs for many years.93  Xerox policed its end-users 
to ensure that they were not selling parts to ISOs.  The ISOs continued 
to purchase parts from a majority-owned European subsidiary of Xerox, 
until Xerox forced it to stop selling parts to ISOs.94  Xerox, like Kodak, 
also competed with ISOs in the service market.95  Furthermore, Xerox 
 
 85. See id. at 1220. 
 86. See id. at 1215. 
 87. Image Technical Servs., 125 F.3d at 1219. 
 88. See id.. 
 89. See, e.g., Telecom Technical Serv. Inc. v. Rolm Co., 388 F.3d 820, 823-24 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (holding that ‘‘an antitrust claim could not be brought based on a refusal to sell 
patented parts or license copyrighted software.’’). 
 90. See id. at 824. 
 91. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1327. 
 92. See id. at 1324. 
 93. See id. 
 94. For a complete description of the facts of the case, see In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. 
Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1131-34 (D. Kan. 1997). 
 95. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1327. 
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had monopoly power in the relevant equipment and parts markets.96  
And, like Kodak, Xerox owned patents for at least some of its parts 
(although the exact extent is not clear from the text of the opinion) and 
held copyrights to its diagnostic software, which was an essential 
component to servicing its machines.97  Xerox refused to sell any parts, or 
to license its software, to certain ISOs.98 
The ISO plaintiff alleged that Xerox was attempting to leverage its 
monopoly power in the high volume equipment and parts markets to 
acquire and/or maintain monopoly power in the relevant service markets 
in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.99  Xerox contended that the 
plaintiff had not suffered any antitrust injury because the alleged injury 
was attributable to Xerox’s lawful refusal to sell patented parts and 
copyrighted software.100  Xerox also contended that the plaintiff could 
not assert a patent or copyright misuse defense to Xerox’s infringement 
counterclaims based on Xerox’s unilateral refusal to deal.101  The trial 
court and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Xerox. 
Declining to follow the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Image Technical 
Services permitting a jury to consider Kodak’s motives for refusal to deal 
with the ISOs, the court in CSU v. Xerox held: 
We see no more reason to inquire into the subjective motivation of 
Xerox in refusing to sell or license its patented works than we found 
in evaluating the subjective motivation of a patentee in bringing suit 
to enforce that same right.  In the absence of any indication of illegal 
tying, fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham litigation, 
the patent holder may enforce the statutory right to exclude others 
from making, using or selling the claimed invention free from liability 
under the antitrust laws.  We therefore will not inquire into the 
subjective motivation for asserting his statutory rights, even though 
his refusal to sell or license his patented invention may have an 
anticompetitive effect, so long as that anticompetitive effect is not 
illegally extended beyond the statutory patent grant.102 
The United States Supreme Court has not resolved the apparent conflict 
between Image Technical Services and CSU v. Xerox. 
Despite the differences between CSU v. Xerox and Image Technical 
Services over the question of subjective motivation and intent, the two 
circuits share a common belief that a patent holder cannot use anti-
 
 96. See id. 
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 101. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1324. 
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competitive means to extend its patent rights beyond the statutory grant.  
In CSU v. Xerox, the Federal Circuit distinguished Image Technical 
Services as a tying case, but in essence agreed that a patent holder who 
unreasonably ventures beyond the boundaries of the patent grant could 
be held liable for antitrust violations.103  As the court in CSU v. Xerox 
reasoned: 
Properly viewed within the framework of a tying case, the footnote in 
[Image Technical Services] can be interpreted as restating the 
undisputed premise that the patent holder cannot use his statutory 
right to refuse to sell patented parts to gain a monopoly in a market 
beyond the scope of the patent.104 
In Image Technical Services, the Ninth Circuit relied on its 
rebuttable presumption that the assertion of intellectual property rights 
constitutes a business justification to an alleged infringer’s antitrust 
claims.105  It permitted the challenger to the monopolist’s conduct to 
offer evidence to rebut the presumption. 
Courts are grappling with two apparently contradictory principles.  
First, the principle that a patentee may refuse to sell or license its 
patented products to a third party, and second, the principle that a 
patentee may not use the patent to extend its monopoly into adjacent 
markets, such as aftermarkets.  Even if the patentee cannot be forced to 
license or sell its products, it cannot take steps that make it unreasonably 
and unjustifiably difficult for an aftermarket competitor to make and sell 
compatible, non-infringing products.  This raises the issue of design 
changes that prevent the use of a competitor’s replacement parts in the 
patentee’s product. 
C. Interface Design Changes 
One issue in the IBM plug-compatible peripheral antitrust lawsuits 
was the plaintiffs’ challenges to IBM’s interface design changes.  As 
discussed above, a monopolist in market A might seek to control market 
B, which is an aftermarket for its products, by making changes in the 
design of its product A, thereby making it more difficult, if not 
impossible, for its competitors to produce complementary products in 
market B.  The courts have alternatively condemned and condoned this 
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2008] PATENTS AND ANTITRUST 477 
practice on antitrust grounds.106 
In GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., the plaintiff competed with 
Kodak in the amateur film developing and print photography markets.107  
The plaintiff contended that from 1955 to 1972, an independent 
photofinishing network of small labs arose that developed film using 
Kodak C-22 chemistry and photofinishers that printed Kodacolor film.108  
As soon as plaintiff and other competitors gained a foothold in the 
market for C-22 color film developing and photofinishing, Kodak 
introduced new formulas that used new chemical reactions to develop the 
film.109  The plaintiff alleged that Kodak’s conduct forced independent 
photofinishers to convert from the old C-22 processing to the new 
Kodak C-41 processing.110  Plaintiff and other independent film 
suppliers were excluded from the market as a result.111  Kodak argued 
that it possessed a nearly unfettered right to introduce new products, but 
the court disagreed, citing both Berkey Photo and Northeastern 
Telephone as clearly ‘‘contrary to Kodak’s contentions, that new product 
introductions by a monopolist are not ipso facto immune from antitrust 
scrutiny’’ and that a ‘‘new product introduction coupled with some 
associated conduct may constitute a [Sherman Act] § 2 violation.’’112 
The court found that Kodak could be held liable.113  Explaining its 
adoption of the reasoning in Northeastern Telephone,114 the court stated: 
[I]n scrutinizing design conduct, § 2 would merely require the 
monopolist’s design to be ‘‘reasonable,’’ rather than to be the design 
alternative least restrictive of competition.  Thus, the ‘‘reasonableness’’ 
of the design of a monopolist’s new products (vis-a-vis competitors’ 
products which were technically linked to or dependent upon the 
monopolist’s product) may be scrutinized under § 2 in cases in which 
‘‘market forces cannot operate’’ -- that is, in cases in which a single 
firm controls the entire market or in which a monopolist engages in 
coercive conduct to affect consumer choice. 115 
Where a monopolist in market A owes his monopoly to a patent, it 
follows that ‘‘market forces cannot operate’’ and a monopolist could be 
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found to engage in coercive conduct affecting consumer choice by re-
designing products to exclude competitors from market B. 
Two recent cases have considered the antitrust implications of 
patents and re-designed products.116  In C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, 
Inc., a patent holder sued a competitor for infringing patents covering 
biopsy guns that mechanically injected a needle into the patient’s body.117  
Both the biopsy guns and the replacement needles were the subjects of 
patents.118  In the infringement suit, the competitor claimed that the 
patent holder had modified its patented biopsy guns and needles for the 
purpose of preventing the competitor’s replacement needles from fitting 
the gun without an adapter.119  The Federal Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision that the patent holder unlawfully maintained its 
monopoly position in the aftermarket for replacement needles by 
exclusionary conduct, i.e., by modifying its patented gun in order to 
prevent the replacement needles of its competitors from fitting in 
them.120  The Federal Circuit’s holding implies that the patent holder 
violated antitrust law by manipulating the interface between the patented 
biopsy guns and the replacement needles in order to control competition 
in the aftermarket for replacement needles.121 
In another medical device case, Medtronic MiniMed Inc. v. Smiths 
Medical MD Inc.,122 MiniMed brought an action for infringement 
against Smiths for its sale of infusion pumps used to deliver insulin to 
diabetics, and the associated infusion ‘‘sets’’ that connected to the 
pumps.123  The infusion pumps were durable goods that lasted many 
years, while the infusion sets were disposable and thrown out after a few 
days.124  Smiths brought a counterclaim for antitrust violations, alleging 
that MiniMed had attempted to monopolize the market for infusion sets 
by redesigning and patenting a lock that acted as a physical interface 
between the infusion pumps and the infusion sets.125  Smiths claimed it 
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had not produced new infusion sets compatible with the new lock 
because MiniMed held a patent on the new lock and Smiths was thus 
apprehensive about getting sued.126  The court rejected Smiths’ claims on 
the basis of standing because Smiths had not suffered an antitrust 
injury.127  The court found that MiniMed had not sued any other 
competitor for infringement of its patent on the new lock, and therefore, 
until Smiths produced and sold infusion sets that were compatible with 
MiniMed’s redesigned infusion pumps, it did not have standing to sue 
for antitrust violations.128  The court also found that Smiths had failed to 
allege a claim for tying, because it had not adequately alleged that 
customers were coerced into buying MiniMed’s infusion sets.129  In the 
course of reaching its decision, the court rejected Smiths’ claim that 
MiniMed had a duty to assist it: ‘‘Smiths argues that the design changes 
to the connection system undertaken by MiniMed could have been 
accomplished without removing the luer lock.  Absent evidence of 
anticompetitive conduct, however, it is not the role of the courts to 
determine how companies should innovate.’’130 
The Bard court felt that judges and juries are competent to second-
guess a patent holder’s design decisions and expressed skepticism at the 
patent holder’s design changes, especially when the purpose of the 
change appeared to be to exclude competition in the market for 
replacement needles.131  By contrast, the court in Medtronic expressed 
skepticism about the competence of judges and juries to use antitrust law 
to regulate perceived product innovations.132  As shown by these two 
cases, courts disagree on the ability of judges and juries to make the 
proper delineation between patents and antitrust.  At the same time, 
courts are reluctant to give antitrust immunity to patent holders when 
they leverage market power in adjacent markets.  Courts should be 
willing to use the antitrust laws to analyze the economic effects of 
company A modifying its product to exclude competitors in an adjacent 
market B, because of the threat of an overall loss of consumer surplus and 
unjustifiably higher prices for consumers of B-type products. 
D. Changes in Drug Formulas 
For nearly every successful patented product, there exists a 
prospective future market for copycat, complementary, or generic 
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products that a competitor will produce and sell upon expiration of the 
patent, at a lower price charged by the patent holder.  The patent holder 
will often attempt to lawfully extend its monopoly to exclude these 
potential competitors by making slight, but patentable, design changes in 
the original product.  A competitor claiming that the patent holder is 
changing its product to prevent the competitor from introducing a 
generic substitute is entitled to proceed with a complaint, according to 
Abbott Laboratories v. Teva Pharmaceuticals.133 
In Abbott Laboratories v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, a generic drug 
manufacturer alleged that the branded drug manufacturer intentionally 
made a series of insignificant changes to its drug as a way to keep the 
generic manufacturer from successfully obtaining Food and Drug 
Administration approval to sell the generic version and successfully 
market it to buyers.134  The court analogized to other adjacent market 
cases to determine that if the allegations were true, the defendant had 
altered the functioning of the marketplace.135  In doing, the patent holder 
reduced consumer choice for drugs by manipulating the laws governing 
sales and marketing of generic drugs, as part of a scheme to extend its 
monopoly into the future.136  By repeatedly shifting the formula of its 
drug, the branded drug manufacturer allegedly prevented its generic drug 
competitors from publishing their competing drugs in the ‘‘Orange 
Book’’ where information about approved generic drugs is disseminated 
to the market.137  Applying the rule of reason, the court permitted the 
generic competitors to proceed with their complaint, which enabled the 
court to conduct an inquiry into the costs and benefits of the defendant’s 
conduct.138 
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Like the cases where a defendant of a durable good or software 
manipulates the interface or interconnection to extend its patent beyond 
the four corners of its original grant to block potential entrants to its 
market, the drug manufacturer allegedly changed the design of its 
branded drug in order to prevent generic manufacturers from establishing 
their fitness as substitutes for the branded drug.  This alleged misuse of 
the patent and U.S. drug laws could not have been foreseen by a patent 
examiner.  There is no economic principle that would grant company A 
under these circumstances any power in market B, since company A was 
already reaping the rewards of innovation conferred by the patent laws.  
The court appropriately examined the particular market and applied the 
antitrust laws to determine whether company A was unlawfully 
leveraging the patent monopoly in product A into market B. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article examined the intersection and potential conflict of 
patents and antitrust.  Patents grant monopolies of limited duration that 
may result in the patent holder having monopoly or market power in one 
or more antitrust markets.  We discussed cases where a patent holder 
uses such market or monopoly power in the market for a patented 
product to exclude competitors in an adjacent market and/or attempts to 
monopolize or monopolizes the adjacent market.  We discussed the role 
that interfaces connecting the patent grant market with an adjacent 
market play in leveraging market power.  Economic theory suggests that 
it is inappropriate to immunize a patent holder from antitrust liability 
when it attempts to extend its patent monopoly into adjacent markets, 
because it could decrease consumer surplus.  Generally, courts have been 
reluctant to examine in detail a patent holder’s innovations and design 
changes.  However, applying antitrust law, courts have found that 
monopolists may be liable for unlawfully extending their monopolies into 
adjacent markets in the areas of computer peripherals and software 
applications; aftermarkets for replacement parts, service and maintenance 
of durable goods; design changes to medical devices; and changes in drug 
formulas.  Although the boundary between patents and antitrust is not 
clearly delineated, the courts are nonetheless reluctant to give antitrust 
immunity to patent holders when they leverage market power in adjacent 
markets. 
